Merger and acquisition deals are governed by merger contracts which are negotiated between bidder and target in order to communicate deal terms, specify risk sharing between the parties, and describe dispute management provisions in case of litigation. In a large sample of manually collected U.S. deal contracts involving publicly traded bidders and targets, we construct indices of M&A contract clauses based on legal scholars' and practitioners' a priori predictions, and hence examine the relationship between abnormal returns earned around the filing of merger agreements and different types of clauses.
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I. Introduction
A large financial economics literature 1 has found that shareholders earn significant abnormal returns over the market on announcement of a merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction.
These studies have found that target shareholders earn positive abnormal returns of between 20 percent and 35 percent, whereas bidder shareholders on average earn zero to small negative abnormal returns. However, every M&A deal is governed by a set of contract terms that are described in detail in an agreement filed with the SEC. These M&A contract clauses are negotiated between the bidder and target in order to communicate deal terms, specify risk sharing between the parties, and describes dispute management provisions in case of litigation (see Coates 2015 for a detailed description of these clauses).
This paper examines the impact of M&A contract clauses on the abnormal returns earned by target and bidder firms around the filing of merger agreements. In doing so, this paper makes five contributions. First, we manually collect detailed information for a large set of M&A contract clauses for 822 U.S. publicly traded target firms for the period 2001-2011. Second, based on legal scholars' and practitioners' a priori predictions we create three M&A contract clause indices, 2 namely the "bidder protective clause" index, the "target protective clause" index, and "competition clause" index, which encapsulate many clauses negotiated by lawyers in M&A contracts. Such clauses include reverse termination fees, termination fees, termination dates, material adverse change (MAC) clauses, match rights, buyer financing conditions, buyer shareholder approval conditions, go shop provisions and walk away rights. Third, we examine if our indices are related to abnormal returns earned by target and bidder firms, respectively. Fourth, we examine if more-reputable lawyers are associated with drafting these M&A contract clauses. Fifth, we examine if our indices are related to the probability of deal completion. Sixth, we examine if our indices are related to the bid premiums paid.
There are two opposing a priori views on the expected relationship between M&A contract clauses and the abnormal returns earned by target and bidder firms. One the one hand, despite the apparent complexity of and variation in such clauses, such clauses might not have any significant effect on the abnormal returns if they are immaterial "boilerplate" agreements "churned" by overpaid lawyers (see Anderson (2012, 2016) ), who are difficult agents for their principals to monitor. On the other hand, such clauses might have a significant effect because they are drafted by expert (and expensive) lawyers in meaningful contracts that modify or make more precise background laws to fit each individual deal and its context. Prior research has shown that contract language evolves in reaction to new case law or statutes or financial risks, or by learning from the 'best practices' of other deal lawyers (see Cain, Macias, and Davidoff Solomon (2014) , and Coates (2016)), consistent with M&A contracts having a meaningful impact. Case studies and practitioner reports also indicate that M&A contracts can have significant impacts on specific transactions. 3 However, no prior study systematically analyzes a large number of different kinds of M&A contract clauses to examine stock market's reaction to M&A contract clauses generally.
We find the following results. First, we find that bidder protective M&A contract clauses correlate with higher bidder abnormal returns. Second, we find that target protective clauses 3 When one of the authors of this paper was a lawyer at the New York M&A law firm of Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, he would routinely be contacted by risk arbitrage funds in their attempt to learn the contents of M&A contracts after the announcement of the deal but before the contracts had been filed with the SEC, consistent with the idea that informed observers viewed the specific clauses in M&A contracts to vary in ways material to their investment strategies. For a case study of how M&A contracts affected a major transaction during the financial crisis, see Ben Esty and David Lane, Dow's Bid for Rohm and Haas, HBS Case Collection (May 2014), available at www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=39648.
correlate with higher target abnormal returns. Third, we find that competition clauses correlate with higher abnormal returns for targets, but have no significant effect for bidders, consistent with variations in such clauses increasing the joint wealth of the parties to a deal. These results show that M&A contract clauses have a significant relationship with the abnormal returns of bidder and target firms, consistent with the expert drafting view of Cain, Macias, and Davidoff Solomon (2014) and Coates (2016) , and inconsistent with the "churning" view of Anderson (2012, 2016) .
Fourth, we find no evidence that more reputable law firms are associated with drafting these M&A contract clauses in ways that significantly affect the indices we construct. Fifth, we find bid premiums are increasing in the indices for target protective and competition clauses, whereas bidder protective clauses have an insignificant relationship with bid premiums. Sixth, we find that buyer protective clauses are associated with a lower probability of deal completion, whereas target protective and competition clauses have an insignificant relationship with the probability of deal completion.
Some studies have examined the impact of a single M&A contract clause on bidder and/or target abnormal returns, as discussed in Section III below. But Coates (2015) points out that many contract terms are typically chosen together in a package of negotiated terms. Accordingly, we differ from prior literature in the following ways. First, we create indices to aggregate the impact of a number of clauses that on a priori grounds in order to capture similar economic effects. Second, we manually collect clauses whereas prior studies use SDC data. We find that SDC often has incorrect information about specific M&A contract clauses. Third, we have included data on clauses which become more common in the 2000s (for example, go shop provisions and match rights provisions), and in some cases incorporate more details about a given clause (for example, fee triggers for termination clauses and reverse termination clauses). Fourth, we are careful to test for abnormal returns using event windows that capture the release of information about merger contract clauses, which are generally not disclosed at the same time as the deal announcement.
Our results are based on correlations between quantifiable variables using regression analysis. We do not attribute our results to some form of causal claim. In order to do so, we would need to identify an exogenous shock that was not expected by the various participants in the merger and acquisitions market place, or some other form of quasi-random experimental "treatment" of merger contract clauses. Clearly, the choice of M&A contract clauses is endogenously determined.
It is extremely hard, and one might also say close to impossible, to identify natural exogenous events which affect one choice variable (for example, one type or set of M&A contract clause) and not be related to another choice variable (for example, whether the deal was a diversifying or related merger, or, indeed, any other merger contract clause). The econometric requirement for valid instrumental variable identification is that the relevant instrumental variable is related to its corresponding endogenous variable only, and not to any other variables independent of its relationship with the endogenous variable. Satisfying this requirement is harder when we have multiple endogenous variables (three merger clause indices and control variables such as percentage cash in the deal payment). Therefore we do not put forward a causal claim to our results.
Note however that our dependent variable is abnormal returns --which the existing literature has shown to be sparsely affected by firm and deal characteristics (unlike a firm value variable such as Tobin's Q). That said, our empirical approach is consistent with other studies that examine the correlation between abnormal returns earned by bidder and target firms and other deal-or partyspecific characteristics.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background information on three groups of M&A contract clauses and Section III reviews the related literature. Section IV describes our data and index construction. Our empirical results are reported in Section V, and Section VI presents our conclusions.
II. Value-Relevant M&A Contract Clauses
In this section we explain the value-relevant M&A contract clauses studied in this paper and how we create three indices that are based on legal scholars' and practitioners' a priori predictions. 4 Table 1 4 We understand that there are many ways to build an index. We use the additive property (adding one for the existence of any specific clause) due to its simplicity and the arguments that any other weighting scheme would be subject to even greater methodological criticism. An equally-weighted additive index seems to be the one with the fewest methodological flaws. Additionally, we create indices for three reasons. First, many of the clauses are jointly drafted to address similar deal and litigation risks (what lawyers often call using the 'belt and 'suspenders approach for keeping one's pants up'). Second, many of the clauses are correlated, making interpretation of their individual effects difficult. And third, some clauses are used sparingly, resulting in low statistical power for testing significance of individual clauses.
protective clauses to abandon the deal. Bidder protective clauses include efficiently designed reverse termination fees (RTFs), longer termination duration, financing conditions, bidder shareholder approval, and MAC clauses with greater coverage and fewer exclusions.
RTFs are provisions in M&A contracts that (in general terms) permit a bidder to terminate a proposed acquisition of a target firm for a fixed fee. RTFs can be efficient if they specify risks and allocate them to the party best able to bear that risk, and if the other deal terms (including price) reflect that risk allocation. The "price" of a risk allocated through an RTF would in theory be optimally based on estimates of the probability and the cost of realization of that risk. But contract terms are sometimes drafted based on non-analogous precedents, or crude or stale estimates of probability and cost of risks. Such terms can even be ex ante efficient by reducing negotiation costs, but exhibit path dependence and result in terms that are ex post value loss.
To empirically model these possibilities, we draw on prior theoretical work by others. we define "inefficient" RTFs if they include triggers that do not reflect exogenous risk (such as regulatory review), but instead reflect (and may add to) agency costs on the part of the buyer managers. We then define an "efficient" RTF as those with fee size higher than a TTF and without a fiduciary out trigger in a cash deal or a non-merger-of-equals stock deal, and include efficient RTFs in our buyer-protective index.
A financing condition is a condition to the bidder's obligation that lets the bidder refuse to close the deal unless the bidder is able to get enough financing to fund the deal. These conditions were once common in cash deals, became increasingly uncommon in the 2000s, but do appear in some deals in our sample. Given that financing conditions are options to walk away from the deal for bidders, we include them in the bidder protective index. 
II.B Target Protective Clauses
Target protective clauses include termination duration, MAC exceptions and walkaway clauses. They protect the target under different adverse events specified in the contract terms.
The termination date -sometimes known as a "drop-dead date" -in an M&A contract is the date both parties specify in the termination section of the agreement. We define termination duration as the number of days between deal announcement and that specified termination date. This is the time period wherein both parties are committed to the deal. Both parties have the right to walk away from the deal before the termination date. A longer termination duration will keep both parties committed to the deal for a longer horizon, making it less likely that the deal will fail to meet the required conditions before the termination date in the contract. Once the deal is signed, the target has a strong interest in trying to keep the deal intact, as it is to receive a more or less certain premium, and is likely to suffer reputational and operational harm if a deal fails.
MAC exception events limit the strength of a bidder's abandonment option. The exceptions specify events that will not be deemed material adverse events. They commonly include a change in trading price or volume of company's stock, changes in interest or exchange rates, war, terrorism, acts of God, political volatility, legal change, national and international calamities, industry-or economy-wide shocks. Gilson and Schwartz (2005) argue that they protect the target and impose exogenous risk on the bidder. Talley (2009) suggests that ambiguity aversion of parties towards market uncertainty help explain MAC exclusion provisions. We draw on Talley (2009) for our empirical specification of MAC exceptions.
Walkaway clauses provide the target the ability to walk away if there is a specified (typically large) drop in the bidder's share price. The level of price drop is typically measured as a specified percentage decrease from the bidder's stock price at deal announcement, or a relative decrease to an index. They protect the target's downside risk when the bidder uses stock as its deal currency.
II.C Competition Clauses
Competition clauses manage the bidding and deal completion process. They either give the target rights to continue to solicit or consider competitive bids after the signing of the merger contract, or give the initial bidder rights to match superior third party offers. Competitive-bid "outs,"
go-shop clauses and match rights fall into this category.
M&A contracts commonly give targets the explicit right to terminate a deal in order to accept a competitive ("topping") bid if received prior to a shareholder vote. Such "competitivebid" outs thus enhance the risk that competition will emerge after an initial deal is announced.
Target termination fees (TTFs) are compensatory payments made by the target to the bidder if the target terminates for specified reasons. Most TTFs are triggered if the target's board decides that a proposed third party offer is superior to the current deal before the vote of the target's shareholders. Using SEC filings that correctly identifies the incidence of termination fee clause, Boone and Mulherin (2007) provide evidence that TTFs enhance rather than impede takeover competition, while Coates and Subramanian (2001) provide evidence that deals with larger TTFs are less likely to face competition and more likely to be completed. Jeon and Ligon (2011) find that target fee size does not affect the target's abnormal returns. Caution should be used in interpreting standard empirical models of the effects of TTFs, however, since they almost always accompany competitive-bid outs. Competitive-bid outs directly permit targets to terminate an initial deal and so should on their own make competitive bids more likely, ceteris paribus, while
TTFs directly require the target to pay money to the initial bidder and so should on their own make competitive bids less likely, ceteris paribus. TTFs effectively add a cost to the use of a competitive-bid out. If that cost is not strictly greater than the expected gain to competitive bidders, the net average effect of the two provisions should be pro-competitive.
Go-shop provisions become an important innovative deal-making technology during the private equity boom of [2005] [2006] [2007] . With this affirmative right, the target has thirty to fifty days to find a topping bid after announcing the deal. Subramanian (2008) examines the effects of go-shop provisions and shows that they yield more aggregate search, significant post-signing competition, and slightly higher returns to target shareholders than traditional no-shop deals. Gogineni and Puthenpurackal (2017) find that go shop provisions are correlated with higher target abnormal returns and are more likely to have a competing bid and an upward revision of the initial bid premium. These finding are consistent with the view that a go-shop clause is an efficient contract design which reflects enhanced bidding competition and works to the target's advantage.
Match rights provide an initial bidder a cushion of time and detailed information about any competing bid before the target is permitted to terminate the initial deal and pursue a superior offer.
Such rights place the initial bidder in a superior position relative to the subsequent bidders. Quinn (2011) argues that reasonable uses of match rights may reduce the initial bidder's uncertainty costs and induce it to make transaction-specific investments.
II.D M&A Contract Clause Indices
In Sections II.A-C we provide detailed descriptions of all the value-relevant M&A contract clauses and divide them into three groups based on legal scholars' and practitioners' a priori predictions. In this section, we describe how we build an aggregate index for each group of M&A contract clauses in the spirit of the Entrenchment Index created by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) . For most of the clauses, we add one point to the relevant indices for its existence. These clauses include financing condition, buyer shareholder approval, match rights, go-shop clauses and walkaway clauses.
In other cases, the inclusion of terms in the indices is more tailored to their contents: RTFs, termination duration, MAC clauses, MAC Exclusions and TTFs. As noted earlier, we draw on analysis in Coates Palia and Wu (2017) to only code "efficiently" designed RTFs as one of the bidder protective clauses. We give one point to the bidder protective index for the presence of such an RTF, but not for other RTFs.
Termination duration has different impacts on the bidder and the target shareholders, as discussed in Sections II.A and B. We calculate the median termination duration and label a deal as having a longer (shorter) termination duration if its termination duration is greater (less) than the median.
Legal scholars such as Gilson and Schwartz (2005) have suggested that MAC clauses protect the bidder by ensuring that that the target firm keeps making synergy-specific investments before the merger closes. Conversely, MAC exclusions protect the target. Talley 
III. Related Literature
The prior literature on value-relevant M&A contract clauses is limited. A few articles examine the relationship between an individual merger clause and bidder or target abnormal returns but none attempt to examine those returns and an index of multiple terms. Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) show that TTFs are efficient contract terms in the sense that they result in higher deal premiums, deal completion rates and insignificant target abnormal returns.
Bates and Lemmon (2003) find that RTFs are used to secure a fraction of target wealth gains in deals with higher negotiation and bid failure costs. Mahmudi, Virani and Zhao (2016) suggest that
RTFs are real options on a firm's assets and they find that the abnormal returns of the combined firm are higher when the bidder's termination fee is not equal to the target's termination fee. Coates, Palia and Wu (2017) find that RTFs can be inefficiently designed and send a negative "signal" to the market regarding future acquisition odds, resulting in lower bidder abnormal returns. Subramanian (2008) finds that pure go-shop provisions in private earn equity deals earn positive target abnormal returns whereas no-shop deals earn zero target abnormal returns.
Many papers examine individual M&A contract clauses but do not relate them to bidder or target abnormal returns. Denis and Macias (2013) argue that MAC clauses have an economically important impact on the takeover dynamics. They show that deals with fewer MAC exclusions are associated with higher arbitrage spreads and deal premiums. Legal scholars also examine some of the protective or competition provisions such as MAC clauses Schwartz, 2005, Talley 2009 ), and match rights (Quinn 2011 Table 3 shows the raw correlation between these three indices. All the pairwise correlation coefficients are very small (less than 0.06), consistent with our a priori expectation that clauses assigned to different indices address different types of risk.
***Table 3*** Panel C of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of individual M&A contract clauses which are the components of these indices. Financing conditions (9%) and buyer shareholder approval requirements (1%) are rare in our sample, so that it is efficient RTFs (14%) and MAC clauses (with an average MEPerc score of 0.32) that are the primary drivers of the buyer protective index. Among target protective clauses, 16% of the deals have walkaway provisions and the proxy for MAC exclusions (1-MEPerc) has an average value of 0.68 for our sample deals. TTFs triggered by competitive bid outs (97%) and match rights (86%) are quite common provisions, which 6 We do not use a dimensional reducing statistical techniques such as principal component analysis for two reasons. First, most of these merger contract terms are dummy variables, whose variations are low, resulting in less statistical power. Second, Browne (1989) shows that factor rotations are not unique making interpretation of each principal component on a clause inaccurate.
explains the high average level of competition index.
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IV.C Control Variables
We create a number of control variables that might be related to announcement abnormal returns. The first control variable is toehold, which is set to unity if the fraction of the target's common stock owned by the bidder on the bid announcement date is greater than 5%, and zero otherwise. The second control variable is related, which is set to unity if the bidder is from the same industry as the target (where industry definitions are taken from Fama and French), and zero otherwise. Previous studies show that bidder abnormal returns are related to whether the merger was a diversifying or focused merger (Matsusaka 1993; Comment and Jarrell 1995, and Hubbard and Palia 1999) . The third variable is lnrelsize, defined as the natural logarithm of target's market value less natural logarithm of acquirer's market value. Asquith, Brunner and Mullins (1983) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find that the abnormal returns are likely to be higher when the target and acquirer of a similar size.
We control for the medium of exchange in an M&A transaction. Travlos (1987), Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), and Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990) find that abnormal returns are higher when the deal has a higher percentage of cash. Accordingly, we include the variable cashpct, which is the percentage of cash used in the deal. We also include the variable tender, which is set to unity if the bid involved a tender offer to target shareholders, and zero otherwise. 
V. Empirical Results
V.A Abnormal Returns
In Panel A and C of In our sample, 37% of the merger agreements are filed with the SEC at least two days after the deal announcement date. 9 To address this issue, we use the merger agreement filing date as the event day, rather than deal announcements, as is more common in M&A-related event studies.
*** 
V.B Abnormal Returns and M&A Contract Clause Indices
We then examine the effects of the three types of M&A contract clauses on abnormal returns. In Table 5 we present regressions of bidder and target three-day period [-5 , +5] abnormal returns on our three M&A contract clause indices, with deal and firm characteristic variables as controls. 10 We also include year dummy variables to control for any macroeconomic trends, the regression coefficients of which are not reported. 11 In column (1), we find that a one standard deviation increase in the bidder protective index correlates with an increase in bidder abnormal returns of 1.77% (0.53 * 3.34%). That translates into a shareholder wealth gain of $44.0 million for a median sized acquiring firm (calculated as bidder CAR times the market value of bidder equity 60 days before the event date). This result is statistically significant at the one-percent level.
We do not find any evidence that target protective and competition indices have any impact on bidder abnormal returns. ***Table 5***
In column (2), we estimate a more fully specified regression model. We add proxies for agency costs. These include the firms' free cash flow (fcf_tgt and fcf_acq) and the fractional ownership of the managers (tgt_insiderown and acq_insiderown) prior to the bid. We also include proxies for information asymmetry between targets and bidders --the firms' market-to-book ratios (mkttobk_tgt and mkttobk_acq) prior to the bid. The coefficient on the bidder protective index remains positive and the significance level is unchanged.
With these controls, we find no evidence that either the target protective index or the competition index effects bidder abnormal returns. Additionally, an F-test on the null hypothesis that the joint impact of the target protective and the competition indices is equal to zero has a value of 0.20 with a p-value of 0.82. This suggests that target protective index and the competition index does not jointly impact bidder abnormal returns.
In columns (3) and (4), we present regressions of target abnormal returns on M&A contract clauses indices and various control variables. We find that a one standard deviation increase in target protective index value correlates with an increase in target abnormal returns of 2.48% (0.57 * 4.35%). That translates into a shareholder wealth gain of $5.77 million for a median sized target firm (calculated as target CAR times the market value of target equity 60 days before the event date). This result is statistically significant at the five-percent level. We also find that a one standard deviation increase in competition index value results in an increase in target abnormal returns of 2.51% (0.43 * 5.84%), which translates into a shareholder wealth gain of $5.84 million for a median sized target firm. This result is statistically significant at the one-percent level.
All of these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that deal lawyers negotiate M&A contract clauses that matter. At least in many deals, bidder protective clauses benefit bidder shareholders and target protective clauses and competition clauses benefit target shareholders.
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Among the control variables, the signs are similar to those found in many previous studies of merger announcement returns, although some are insignificantly different from zero. Deals with higher percentage of cash as their currency have higher abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are higher if the target firm and acquiring firm are of a similar size.
In Table 6 , we run the same set of regressions using a longer event window [-1, +1] around the merger agreement filing date to test the robustness of our results. We find that all our results of Table 5 generally hold.
***Table 6*** In summary, the above results show that bidder abnormal returns are higher when the bidder protective index is higher. Additionally, target abnormal returns are higher when the target protective index and competition index is higher. 13 We cannot rule out that variations in some clauses are meaningless, at least in some deals, but our results are inconsistent with the more 12 All our qualitative results hold when we include the E-index, number of additional competing bids, and number of potential bidders in the same industry as the target firm (at the 3-digit SIC level) in our regressions. Results are not reported but available from the authors. 13 We also checked if there are differing impacts in "bad" deals versus "good" deals. We use an ex-ante definition of "good" and "bad" deals based on prior finance research (e.g., Chang 1998; Betton et al. 2008; Eckbo et al. 2018) , which have found positive stock market reactions to cash-funded deals, and negative stock market reactions to stockfunded deals. We define three proxies of "bad" deals (with the opposite definition as "good" deals). The first proxy for "bad" deals is if the median of exchange is all stock; the second proxy for "bad" deals is if the median of exchange is partly stock, and the third proxy is below the median cash percentage in the transaction. Using the three definitions, we find a larger impact for "bad" deals over "good" deals for the buyer protective index regressions. No statistically significant differences are found between "bad" and "good" deals for target protective index and competitive index regressions. Results are not reported but available from the authors.
general hypothesis that M&A contract clauses are generally value-irrelevant boilerplate.
V.C M&A Contract Clause Indices and Lawyer Reputation
Given that we find the bidder's (target's) abnormal returns are higher when the bidder protective index (target protective index and competition index) is higher, we now check if these indices are drafted by more reputable lawyers. Some papers have suggested that lawyer reputation is value enhancing for their clients. Gilson (1984) argues that business lawyers create value by being transaction cost engineers that increase the market value of their clients' transactions. In a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, Gilson and Mnookin (1994) suggest that clients can use lawyers with strong reputation to credibly signal to the other side that they are cooperative.
Coates (2012) finds that law firms with more M&A experience but less private target firm experience are less likely to choose Delaware as the forum for dispute resolution, whereas firm with less M&A experience omit forum selection clauses. Krishnan, et. al (2013) finds that top law firms representing both bidders and targets increase the probability of shareholder litigation.
In order to get proxy variables for the bidders and targets law firm reputation, we use two definitions of law firm reputation. The first definition for law firm reputation is based on the idea that more reputable lawyers can charge higher fees. We use as our independent variable the dollar Similarly, we define dummy variables for target law firm's reputation that is based on the top 10 and top 15 profits per partner rank, respectively.
Our second definition for law firm reputation is based on the prestige rank of the law firm by Vault. The top 100 law firms are ranked by Vault each year. If the law firm is not listed in the top 100, we give it a rank 101. Similarly, we create four dummy variables (two for the acquirer's law firm and two for the target's law firm) that is based on the law firm's Vault ranking.
We then estimate regressions wherein the dependent variables are the three M&A contract clause indices, the results of which are given in Table 7 . We run 12 regressions, three M&A contract clause indices times two definitions of reputation (rankings based on profits per partner from Am Law 200 series and Vault magazine) times dummy variables for top-10 or top-15 rank.
We include the other independent variables used in Table 5 , but only present the results on the layer reputation variables. We present results of regressing the bidder_protective_index (target_protective_index or competition_index) on the acquirer (target) law firm reputation, respectively. Given that the dependent variables are continuous when they are either the buyer protection index or the target protection index we estimate OLS regressions. Given that the competition index is a count variable we estimate a Poisson regression.
We find no statistically significant evidence that the buyer protective index and the competition index is correlated with either the target's or the acquirer's law firm reputation. In the case of the target protective index we find a negative relationship. This result is contrary to the hypothesis that more reputable law firms draft provisions in the target protective index that correlate with higher target abnormal returns. In summary, we find no evidence that more reputable law firms are associated with drafting these M&A contract clause indices. 14 ***Table 7***
V.D Bid Premiums and M&A Contract Clause Indices
We now examine if the bid premiums offered to target firms are related to the three merger clause indices. As in Roll (1988) and Callahan, Palia, and Talley (2018), we define bid premiums as the natural logarithm of gross deal premiums. Gross deal premiums are defined as the bid price bid price divided by the target's closing stock price one week prior to deal announcement, and is winsorized at the one-percent and 99-percent level. As in the above papers, by taking natural logarithms and winsorizing, we have significantly reduced the right-tail skewness of bid premiums.
We regress bid premiums on the independent variables used in Table 5 . The results of such an analysis are given in Table 8 .
***Table 8*** We find target protective and competition indices are correlated with higher bid premiums paid for the target firm. An F-test on the null hypothesis that the joint impact of the target protective and competition indices is equal to zero shows strong statistically significant rejection (p-value of 0.002). These results are consistent with those in Tables 5 and 6 , wherein target firms earned higher abnormal returns when the deals had higher values of protective and competition indices. We find that bidder protective indices are insignificantly related to bid premiums at conventional levels of statistical significance. However, we find a negative sign, which is the correct sign that would imply less overpayment by bidders resulting in higher bidder abnormal returns.
V.E Deal Completion Probability and M&A Contract Clause Indices
But it is also possible that the positive relationship between the three indices and bidder/target abnormal returns is impacted by the probability of deal completion. In Table 9 , we firm reputation used above, correlate significantly with the for law firm reputation rank tables of SDC. Results are not reported but available from the authors.
estimate Probit models wherein the dependent variable is if the deal was completed or not. To the extent that bidder protective clauses give the bidder's option to abandon the acquisition, we expect the value of bidder protective index to be negatively associated with the probability that the acquisition is completed. Consistent with our prediction, the results in columns (1) and (4) indicate that having more bidder protective clauses significantly lowers deal completion rates. A one standard deviation increase in the value of bidder protective index results in a negative 15.9% change in the probability of completion. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with bidder-protective clauses actually mattering to bidder choices, and in line with the market reactions reported above.
***Table 9*** By contrast, the results in columns (2) and (4) suggest that competition clauses do not truncate the natural bidding process by letting self-interested target managers to hand-select friendly bidder in exchange for a side payment. Nor do we find evidence in columns (3) and (4), with respect to target protective clauses, that including such clauses lowers the deal completion
rates. An F-test on the null hypothesis that the joint impact of the target protective and competition
indices is equal to zero shows statistical insignificance (p-value of 0.83).
We summarize the results on bid premiums and completions probabilities. We find that bid premiums are increasing in target protective clauses and competition clauses, and deal completion probabilities are lower with more bidder protective clauses. This suggests that target abnormal returns are higher because bid premiums are higher when the deal has more target protective and competition clauses. Additionally, bidder abnormal returns are higher with more bidder protective clauses because deal completion probabilities are lower. This latter result can be best understood in the context wherein the average abnormal returns earned by bidders in M&As is negative.
Bidder protective clauses reduce the probability of making such value-decreasing transactions.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the value-relevance of M&A contracts, which are typically chosen together in a package of negotiated terms. We build M&A contract clause indices based on legal scholars' and practitioners' a priori predictions, in the spirit of the Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, (2009) . We find that all three indices exhibit wide variations and low correlation with each other, which allows us to examine their differential impact on abnormal returns earned by bidder and target shareholders in a large sample of M&A deals. First, we find evidence that buyer protective index, built primarily on RTFs and MAC clauses, is positively related to bidder abnormal returns. Second, we find that a higher target protective index, built primarily on termination duration, walkaway clauses and MAC exclusions, results in higher target abnormal returns. Third, we find that the competition index, which is built on competitive bid outs, match rights and go-shop clauses, is positively related to target abnormal returns.
Fourth, we find we find no evidence that more reputable law firms are associated with drafting these M&A contract clause indices. Fifth, we find bid premiums are increasing in target protective and competition clauses, and buyer protective clauses decrease the probability of deal completion. This suggests that target abnormal returns are higher because bid premiums are higher when the deal has more target protective and competition clauses. Additionally, bidder abnormal returns are higher because deal completion probabilities are lower. This latter result can be best understood in the context wherein the average abnormal returns earned by bidders in M&As is negative. Bidder protective clauses reduce the probability of making such value-decreasing transactions.
Our results for M&A contract clauses are not consistent with the "churning" hypothesis, in which merger agreements consist of standardized terms with no economically consequential market impacts (see Anderson (2012, 2016) ). On the contrary, we find evidence that many clauses in heavily negotiated M&A contracts are value relevant to bidders and target shareholders. Given substantial growth in the length of M&A contracts over time, our findings are consistent with the argument that M&A contract clauses have significant value-relevance because they are drafted by lawyers who modify and innovate on prior contracts to fit each individual deal (see Cain, Macias, and Davidoff Solomon (2014) , and Coates (2016)).
While our research design does not allow us to make strong claims about causality, we do find that M&A contract clauses indices correlate strongly with stock price reactions while controlling for other factors that influence abnormal returns. Our findings of correlations between contract clauses and premiums and deal completion probabilities lends credence to the possibility that such clauses do have a causal effect on whether deals that are completed are better than other deals, and the extent to which target shareholders are able to extract higher prices as a result of such clauses. Future research on M&A might want to control for these contract clauses. buyerapproval Dummy variable equal to unity if the tender offer is used and the agreement includes a buyer shareholder approval condition section, and zero otherwise.
MEPerc 15
Quasi-percentage of total MAC provisions to total of all provisions = totmac / (totmac+ totexc + 1), wherein totmac= number of MAC clauses, and totexc = total number of MAC exclusions.
walkawaypresence Dummy variable equal to unity if the agreement provide targets the ability to walk away if the buyer's stock price falls by X%, absolutely or relative to an index, and zero otherwise.
competitivebidout Dummy variable equal to unity when a target termination fee exists and the termination fee clause is triggered by an alternative bid, and zero otherwise.
goshoppresence Dummy variable equal to unity if the agreement includes a right for target to solicit topping bids for X days after signing, and zero otherwise. tender Dummy variable equal to unity if the bid is structured as a tender offer, and zero otherwise.
cashpct Percentage of cash that is used in the merger.
mkttobk_tgt Target firm's market-to-book ratio in the fiscal year prior to the merger.
mkttobk_acq Acquiring firm's market-to-book ratio in the fiscal year prior to the merger.
lev_tgt Target firm's total debt divided by its total assets in the year prior to the merger.
lev_acq Acquiring firm's total debt divided by its total assets in the year prior to the merger. We define two dummy variables for the acquirer's law firm reputation. The first dummy variable is set to unity if the acquirer's law firm is ranked in the top 10 firms based on profits per partner, and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable is set to unity if the acquirer's law firm is ranked in the top 15 firms based on profits per partner, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define dummy variables for target law firm's reputation that is based on the top 10 and top 15 profits per partner rank, respectively. Our second definition for law firm reputation is based on the prestige rank of the law firm by Vault. The top 100 law firms are ranked by Vault each year. If the law firm is not listed in the top 100, we give it a rank 101. Similarly we create four dummy variables (two for the acquirer's law firm and two for the target's law firm) that is based on the law firm's Vault ranking. For regressions wherein the dependent variables are continuous (i.e., the bidder protective and target protective indices), we estimate OLS regressions. For the count variable competition index we estimate a Poisson regression. We run 12 regressions, three M&A contract clause indices times two definitions of reputation (rankings based on profits per partner and Vault ) times dummy variables for top-10 or top-15 rank. We include other independent variables used in Table 5 , but only present the results on the lawyer reputation variables. We present regressions of the buyer_protective index on the acquirer's law firm reputation, and regressions of the target_protective_index and the competition_index on the target's law firm reputation. Other independent variables are defined in 
